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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
WILLIAM B DGE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 
a corporation 
Plaintiff and D f nda nt 
vs. 
E.N.MAUGHA as County Treasurer of 
Cache County, State of Utah, 
Defendant an-d Appellant 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
GEORGE D. PRESTON 
LEON FONNESBECK 
Attorneys fo r Defendant and Appellant. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
WILLIAM BUDGE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, 
a corporation, 
Plai11tiff and Defenda·nt 
vs. 
E. N. MAUGHAN, as County Treasurer of 
Cache County, State of Utah, 
Defendant and Appellant 
In this case the plaintiff, William Budge Memorial 
Hospital, a corporation, brought a·n injunction against the 
County Treasurer of Cache County to enjoin him from 
collecting the taxes, $991.46, levied and assessed as the 
general state and county taxes against the property of 
plaintiff for the year 1928. The injunction is sought on 
the alleged ground that the plaintiff's property is used 
exclusively for charitable purposes and is therefore ex-
empt. The plaintiff's claim that its property is exempt 
was denied by defendant, and defendant affirmatively 
alleged that plaintiff was a corporation organized for 
pecuniary profit and gain, and that its property was not 
used exclusively for charitable purposes but that all pat-
ients who entered its hospital were required to pay the 
regular and substantial hospital fees, etc. The trial court 
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found and held that plaintiff's property was used exclu~­
ively for charitable purposes and was therefore exempt 
and enjoined defenda:nt from collecting said tax or any 
part thereof. A new trial having been asked by defend-
ant and denied by the court, the defendant now appeals 
to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The plaintiff is a corporation organized in 1914 un-
der the laws of this State, as the Budge ~Hospital with a 
capital stock of $35,000.00 divided into 3500 shares at 
$10.00 each. It was organized as the articles of incorpor-
ation show, in all respects as other stock share corpora-
tions, organized for pecuniary profit and gain. The hos-
pital owns its grounds, buildings, furniture, and equip-
ment. The main building and the Nurses Home are both 
three story buildings, in addition to the basements. The 
main building is 100 feet long by 40 feet in width, and 
the Nurses Home is 80 feet long by 40 feet in width. The 
rates charged by the hospital are $2.50 per day in a ward, 
$4.00 per day for private room, with a few rooms at $5.00 
per day (Ab. 23). 
The purpose of the organization of the corporation 
is stated in article 6 as follows: 
Article 6. 
"That the purpose of said corporation and the busi-
ness for which the same is formed, is to build, establish, 
operate and maintain, at Logan City, Utah, and at such 
other place or places as may be decided upon by the 
board of directors, a hospital, or hospitals, for the treat-
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ment and care of persons suffering from any and all ail-
ments, e..xcepting the treatment of such ailments and dis-
eases as may be, by the by-laws of said corporation, ex-
cluded, and to install in said hospital any and all conven-
iences equipments and appliances for the proper care and 
treatment of the patients of said hospital or hospitals: to 
acquire, own and hold real estate and all kinds of person-
al property and mixed property and to sell, mortgage, 
hypothicate a·nd otherwise dispose of the same; to acquire, 
hold and own, sell, mortgage, hypothicate and otherwise 
dispose of all other kinds of property, rights, privileges 
and franchises that may be deemed of value or useful in 
carrying out any of the purposes of the corporation; to 
incur indebtedness in such amount as may b~ deemed 
necessary or expedient; to buy or otherwise acquire, sell 
and dispose of stock in other corporations, or associations 
organized for any purpose similar to this corporation and 
in general to do anything incidental to the main purpose 
of this corporation which in the discretion of the board of 
directors for the time being may be considered necessary, 
convenient and proper to carry out said corporate pur-
poses.'' 
Shortly after its incorporation its capital stock was 
increased and the name of the Hospital was changed from 
the "Budge-Hospital" to the "Utah-Idaho Hospital", under 
which name the plaintiff operated until 1927, when the 
name was changed to "The William Budge Memorial 
Hospital". 
J.n the latter part of January and the fore-part of 
February, 1928, an attempt was made to alter or change 
the purpose of the corporation by an attempted amend-
ment of Article 6. The "Notice of Stockholders Meeting", 
mailed out by the Secretary (Plaintiff's Exhibit C) sets 
forth the proposed amendment, and is as follows: 
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"Notice of Stockholders Meeting. 
To the Stockholders of the William Budge Memorial 
Hospital: 
You will please take notice that the annual meeting 
of the stockholders of the William Budge Memorial Hos-
pital will be held at the Hospital Building in Logan, Utah, 
on Tuesday the 31st day of January 1928, at 2 o'clock P. 
M. of said day. 
You are further advised that in addition to the or-
dinary business of the corporation the stockholders will 
consider the advisability of amending Article Six of the 
Articles of Incorporation of the Corporation to read as 
follows: 
ARTICLE VI. 
The corporation is created for the purpose of main-
taining, operating, and conducti~ng hospitals and other 
institutions for the care and treatment of sick, wounded, 
injured and infirm persons, of maintaining schools and 
other places for the education and training of nurses; of 
acquiring, holding, owning and controlling suitable 
grounds and structures to carry out the objects of this 
corporation, with power to receive from any source wha~ 
ever gifts, donations devises and bequests of real and per-
sonal property, for the use and benefit of the corporation; 
to charge and receive compensation for nursi·ng and treat-
ing patients; to nurse and treat patients free of charge 
whenever, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, they 
are worthy objects of charity; to have and exercise all the 
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rights, po"·ers and prh··iledges given to such corporation by 
common Ia"·: to sue and be sued: to borrow n1oney and sr~-t·­
ure the payment thereof by notes, mortg·ages and deeds of 
trust upon the personal and real property of the corpora-
tion: to moratgage. incumber, lease, sell or convey such real 
and personal property as may be necessary and proper to 
carry out the objects of the corporation. unless such prop-
erty has been received as a gift or devise for some special 
purpose. and if so received, it shall be used and applied 
only for such a purpose, provided, however, that in no 
event shall any profit result from the management or 
operation of this Corporation, of any of its hospitals or 
properties, to the incorporators, or stockholders herein, or 
to any other person, except the general public, for whose 
benefit this corporation has been organized, and all 
money received by this corporation from any source what-
ever, in excess of the actually necessary expenses and dis-
bursements required for carrying out the objects of this 
Corporation, shall be used and held for the sole benefit 
and advantage of this corporation, in the furthering of 
the charitable purposes for w~ich it has been organized. 
"From net profits arising from the hospitals or other 
properties of the Corporation, if any such profits there 
shall be, the Board of Directors shall, from time to time, 
set apart, as a sinking fund, such sums as it may deem ad-
visable, to be used whenever, in the opinion of the Board, 
the same should be used for the. maintainance, enlarge-
ment or improvement of the hospitals or other corporate 
properties." 
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"It is the opinion of the Board of Directors that this 
amendment should be made as it would be for the bem 
interest of the hospital. 
"By reason of the recent change made in the name of 
the Hospital, from Utah-Idaho Hospital to William Budge 
Memorial Hospital, it will be necessary for you to send in 
your stock certificate properly signed, so that a new stock 
certificate bea.ring the name of WILLIAM BUDGE ME-
l\10RIAL HOSPITAL can be issued to you.. We would 
thank you to give this your immediate attention so that 
the cha:nge can be made witho~ut delay. 
''Also kindly give us your latest address so that fut-
ure notifications may be properly forwarded to you. 
William Budge Memorial Hospital. 
Geo. Y. Smith, Secretary." 
The policy of the hospital is to cha.rge all patients, 
who enter its doors for care and treatment, the regular 
hospital fees. If the patient is sent to the hospital by the 
Relief Society, the Bishop of a Ward, or any social clubs, 
etc., the policy of the hospital is to charge, and it aims to 
collect from the members of .such relief society, ward, 
church or club the full and regular hospital fees due from 
such poor patient. The Hospital ha.s no policy to even re-
duce its regular hospital charge or fee to such poor pat-
ients. If the patient is impecunious and unable to pay 
the hospital fees, and is not sponsored or taken care of 
by the Relief Society, Bishop of the Ward, or club, etc., 
then it is the policy of the hospital to apply to the County 
1.: 
lr 
! .. 
ttt: 
:d 
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Con1missioners of Cache County and haYe the County pay 
the regular hospital charg-e or fee for such poor patient. 
The statements and bills so presented by the hospital to 
the County have always been paid by the County to the 
hospital as presented and have been paid out of the County 
poor fund (Ab. 51). 
That it is the policy of plaintiff to thus charge its reg-
ular hospital fee from all patients \\·ho enter its doors for 
care and treatment is to a large extent admitted by the 
pleadi11cas: In paragraph 3 of the Reply we read: 
''but plaintiff alleges the facts to be in that respect that 
the plaintiff has at all times charged patients who enter-
ed i~ hoSpital for care cp1d treatment only such hospital 
fees as were fair, reasonable and moderate and necessary 
to be charged for the maintenance, operation and upkeep 
of said hospital, including the purchase of necessary 
equipment and the providing of necessary facilities for 
proper hospital service for the people of the section of 
country served by said hospital; and that all the income 
of said hospital has at all times been devoted to said pur-
poses and has been used for no other purpose." 
Again in paragraph 4 of the Reply: 
"Answering paragraph IV plaintiff admits that it has 
been is policy during the year 1928, and prior thereto, to 
collect its regular hospital fees from all patients entering 
its hospital for care and treatment who were able to pay, 
and admits that at various and diverse times plaintiff has 
applied to the County Commissioners of Cache County for 
the payment of hospital fees for care and treat~ent of 
indigent persons cared for and treated at its hospital." 
That such is the policy of the plaintiff Hospital is also 
frankly admitted by Dr. D. C. Budge, the Medical Director 
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of the plaintiff Hospital and Chairman of the Medical 
Staff, in his direct examination (A b. 23, 24): 
"The territory served by the hospital is Cache Valley, 
Box Elder County, Rich County, Bear Lake, and Southe~n 
Idaho. All patients who applied in 1928 were admitted 
except contagious diseases and insanity cases.. Patients 
were sent to the hospital by anybody, ·bishops of wards 
and churches, Kiwanis and Rotary clubs, and other or-
ganizations. No distinction was made as to race, color, 
or creed. All patients were charged. 
Q.: No matter from what source they came? 
A.: We would attempt to have patients pay, yes. I 
think they did .not all pay in 1928. Our policy in 1928 was 
to have it understood and the patients are notified as early 
as possible, or the responsible party appraised, that the 
hospital bills must be paid. It is expected that the bills 
will be paid by the time they are ready to leave the 
hospital. 
Q.: Your policy is to collect from all? 
A.: Yes, or as much as we can do so. 
Q.: In other words, so that I may understand you, if 
any org~nization or a bishop of a ward or the Rotary club 
or some other organization sent a patient there you would 
attempt to get pay from the members of the organization 
that se.nt the patients? 
A.: Yes." 
And also in his cross-examination (A b. 25, 26, 28): 
"Once in a while we get patients from wards, the 
.., 
•.I 
i)! 
[ffl 
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The patient is admitted as a charity case, but the patient 
is billed for the an1ount of the hospital t·harg·e, the same 
as any other patient. The san1e is true '\'hen the patient 
is brought in by the Rotary clubs, or the Bishop of the 
wards, or other relief organizations. 
The County occasionally sends poor patients to the 
hospital, and they are charged the same rate as other 
patients, including fees for laboratories, tests, X-rays, 
etc. In such cases we bill the County for the amount of 
the ha;pital fees. The County understands that the case 
is a county charge. The County pays for all patients sent 
to the hospital from the County. I call a patient that we 
receive from the county ·a charity patient although the 
County pays for all the charges. In the same way I call 
the patients we receive from a ward in the church a 
charity patient, although the Bishop pays the hospital fees. 
If only the hospital part of it is paid, we call it a charity 
case. 
If the doctor's fee is paid, then it is not a charity case. 
It is a charity case so far as the hospital is concerned, al-
though the hospital fees are paid, because the hospital 
takes all the fees that it receives and puts them back into 
the institution for its maintenance and expense, and for 
upbuilding and to make it better for patients that come 
there hereafter; no member, director or officer or anybody 
else gets a cent out of the institution. That is the reason 
it is a charity institution. 
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All patients who enter our hospital are charity pat-
ients so far as the hospital is concerned. There is no 
distinction so far as the hospital is concerned whether the 
party who goes and pays his own way or whether the pat-
ient is paid for. by the Bishop of the ward or the Church 
, 
or the County. 
As near as it can the hospital aims to colleGt its hos-
pital charges in all cases. The ·hospital does not receive 
patients as a purely charity case with the idea that there 
is no charge for the patients from any source. When they 
come there they understand that the hospital fee is to be 
paid from some source. I don't remember of any case in 
1928 who came there and said they couldn't pay for the 
hospital charges where the hospital has taken care of 
them*** 
The witness: As I stated this morning, there is no 
distinction so far as the hospital fees are concerned 
whether the patient was produced by a member of the 
staff, or by the ward, or by the County or a club. In all 
cases the hospital fees must be paid. Although that is a 
fact, I still consider them charity cases. No matter 
whether the Bishop paid for the poor patient or who paid, 
or if it was a charity organization or a church or anybody 
else, it was considered a charity case. If the man paid his 
ow.n hospital fees and did not pay the doctor's fee, I 
would say it was a charity case. 
Although the ·hospital fees are paid by the patient, it 
is still a charity case. If, for example, John Smith should 
i< 
I 
·r 
:.:! 
;. 
I: . ., 
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bring his wife to our hospital and she should unrler-g'O an 
operation, if he paid the hospital fee for his wife but did 
not pay for the doctor's fee for the operation, \\"e would 
consider it a charity case. The X-ray is a part of the hos-
pital charge a-nd is collected by the hospital at the tin1e. 
75 percent of all the X-ray charges go to Budge Clinic. 
The hospital pays this percentage to the doctor who oper-
ates the X-ray machine because the X-ray is such a tech-
nical instrument. and particularly the reading of the 
pictures that it requires an expert, and the hospital pays 
him that percentage for his services.,. 
Likewise, the haspital Superintendent, 0. J. Larsen, 
testified that all patients were told when they entered the 
hospital that they were expected to pay the hospital or 
make arrangements to pay the hospital fee before they 
left; that the hospital fees, which the plaintiff hospital 
charges and tries to collect are the regular charges that 
are charged all patients, standard hospital charges; that 
the total unpaid hospital accounts for the year 1928 
amounted to only $272.76, which he as such superintend-
ent had made every effort to collect (A b. 37). The gross 
earnings of the ·hospital in 1928 was in excess of $48,000.00, 
all of which wes collected, except the $272.00 (Ab. 35). 
The net earnings of the hospital for the year 1928 was 
$5000.00 (Exhibit 12). 
In addition to the above admissions by the plaintiff, 
it must also be kept in mind that the defendant offered to 
prove by witnesses subpoenaed and present at the trial 
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that not only was it the policy of the plaintiff hospital to 
collect its regular hospital fees from all its patients, in-
cluding poor patients, but that on many occasions, cover-
ing a period of 8 to 10 years prior to 1928, the plaintiff 
hospital had actually on various occasions detained its 
poor patients and prevented them from leaving the hos-
pital until the liospital fees were paid. The objection to 
the introduction of this testimony was sustained by the 
Court on the ground that it was incompetent (too remote) 
and cumulative.. To that rulirng of the Court defendant 
excepted, and cites as error (A b. 56, Error No. 4). 
·The plaintiff hospital is a closed hospital, all major 
surgery is confined exclusively to Dr. D. C .. Budge and his 
brother S. M. Budge whom he has taken in with him on 
the surgery end, both are members of the Budge Clinic. 
The operation. of the X-ray machine is confined to Doctor 
Hayward (Ab. 30), who is a brother-in-law of Dr .. D. C. 
Budge, arid a member of the Budge ·clinic, and the medical 
staff of the hospital (Ab. 39)~ The Budge Clinic gets 
75% of all laboratory and X-ray fees charged and collect-
ed by the hospital from the patients. The hospital keeps 
up and pays all expenses in connection with the X-ray 
machine as well as the laboratory, out of its 25lfo split. 
The 75Cfo of the gross earnings from these two sources are 
paid over to the Budge Clinic by the hospital without any 
deductions for any portion of the expense (A b. 37). The 
hospital fees thus collected by the hospital, for laboratory 
and X-ray service and tuflned over to the Budge Clinic in 
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19~S amounted to $6170.06 (A b. 5~). The inco1ne to the 
hospital from the X-ray for the year 19~~ was $1-11·-1.~5: 
the X-ray expense to the hospital for the year 1 ~l~~ was 
$1116.60 in addition to the expense for supplies for the 
X-ray, electric energy charge, etc. (A b. 36). 
The complaint alleges that the hospital is a corpora-
tion, and owns certain property with the buildings there-
on which have been maintained and operated for the care 
and treatment of the sick, injured and infirm persons, and 
that plaintiff has also maintained and conducted a home 
for the accommodation, comfort and education and train· 
ing of nurses, and that the said real estate is necessary 
for the convenient use and occupation of the said hospital 
equipment and plant; which allegations are admitted by 
the Answer. The complaint also alleges that the said 
property of the plaintiff corporation with the buildings 
thereon, has at all times been used and now is used ex-
clusively for charitable purposes, which allegation is de-
nied by the Answer. 
The Answer affirmatively alleges and the Reply ad-
mits: 
1. That the plaintiff, William Budge Memorial·Hos-
pital, is the same corporation as the Utah-Idaho Hospital, 
which was organized April 24, 1914. 
2. That plaintiff corporation has paid taxes each 
year on its property since its organization prior to 1928. 
3. That it has been the policy of the plaintiff during 
the year 1928, and prior thereto, to charge and collect its 
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regular hospital fees from all patients entering its hos-
pital for care and treatment. 
. That at various and diverse times plaintiff has ap-
plied to the County Commis'sioners for the payment of 
hospital fees for the care and treatment of indigent per-
sons cared for and treated at its hospital. 
The Answer alleges affirmatively, amd the Reply de-
nies, thus putting in issue the following allegations: 
1. That the Utah-Idaho Hospital was organized as 
a corporation· for pecuniary profit, and that neither under 
the name of the Utah-Idaho Hospital, nor the William 
Budge Memorial Hospital, has the plaintiff complied with 
the laws of this State governing the organization of cor-
porations not for pecuniary profit and gain. 
2. That during the year 1928, and for many years 
prior thereto it has been the policy of the plaintiff to de-
mand and collect large and substantial hospital fees from 
all patients entering its hospital for care and treatment, 
and that such fees be paid before patients left the hos-
pital; which has necessitated at times public subscription 
a'lld donation in order to relieve poor patients. 
3. That plaintiff's hospital is not open to all medical 
practitioners in good standing, but is operated for the use, 
benefit, and gain of certain members of the medical pro-
fession belonging to or affiliated with the Budg.e Clinic, 
who own or control a majority of the stock of the plaintiff 
corporation, and thus dominate the policy of the hospital. 
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ARGUMENT. 
These matters thus put in issue all go to tht\ one big 
and controlling question before the court in this case: Is 
the plaintiff a charitable institution, and is its property 
used ~TclusiPely for charitable piH'poses? If it is, then all 
will agree that the plaintiff is entitled to have its property 
exempt from the payment of taxes. If plaintiff's proper-
ty is not thus used, then plai-ntiff should be required to 
pay its fair share of the taxes, for it is the mandate of the 
Constitution and the laws of this State, that ~'all property 
in the state (not exempt) shall be taxed in proportion to 
its value.., {Article 13, Sec. ~. Constitution; Sec. 5861, 
Compiled Laws 1917). 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in its judg-
ment holding that plaintiff's property was used exclusive-
ly for charitable purposes and was therefore exempt from 
the payment of taxes, and perma·nently enjoining the de-
fendant, as County Treasurer of Cache County, from col-
lecting the taxes levied and assessed against the plain-
tiff's property for the year 1928, for the following reasons: 
A. From the admissions made and conceded by the 
plaintiff in its pleadings, it affirmatively appears that the 
plaintiff is not a charitable institution and that its prop-
erty is not used exclusively for charitable purposes; for in 
the Reply it is affirmatively alleged, and admitted: (1) 
That plaintiff is the same corporation as the Utah-Idah~ 
Hospital and owns and conducts the same hospital prop-
erty, (and the Articles of Incorporation admitted in evi-
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de.nce conclusively show that the Utah-Idaho Hospital was 
organized for the purpose of carrying on said hospital 
business for pecuniary profit and gain); (2) That plain-
tiff has at all times charged the patients who entered its 
hospital reasonable fees, necessary for the maintenance, 
operation and upkeep of the hospital, includi·ng the pur-
chase of necessary equipment and providing necessary 
facilities, etc. (3) That it was the plaintiff's policy 
during the year 1928, and prior thereto, "to collect its 
regular hospital fees from all patients entering its hos-
pital for care and treatment who were able to pay, and 
admits that at various and diverse times plaintiff has ap-
plied to the County Commissioners of Cache County for 
the payment of hospital fees for care and treatment of in-
digent persons cared for and treated at its hospital." From 
such admissions in the pleadings, it is submitted the 
judgment holding that plaintiff's property is used ex-
clusively for charitable purposes is erroneous and can not 
be sustained. 
B. From the plaintiff's own testimony it affirm-
atively and conclusively appears that the plaintiff's hos-
pital property is not used for charitable purposes, but is 
used in carrying on the business of conducting a private 
hospital as a regular and ordi·n.ary business institution, 
and for the private interest and benefit of those who man-
age and control it. Dr .. D. C. Budge stated that he con-
. 
sidered all patients, at the hospital charity patients so far 
as the hospital was concerned, although the full hospital 
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fees were paid. Manifestly that is not tht."\ Ia'"· \Vhen tht\ 
recipients pay for what they receive tlH'Y art\ not on 
charity. Phillips vs. St. Le'vis R. R. Co .. 17 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 1167 Mo. 
C. Defendanfs Exhibit 12. made from the Report 
of Plaintiff's Auditor, Parley Petersen, on the books of the 
plaintiff corporation for the year 1928, shows that the 
plaintiff made a net gain in the year 1928 of in excess of 
$5000.00, over all expenses and disbursements for that 
year. The books of the plaintiff corporation also show 
that during the year 1928. the gross receipts (gross hos-
pital charges collected from patients) were in excess of 
$48,000.00, and that the hospital collected all of this 
money except $272.00 (about ! of one percent), which 
was represented largely by sundry small X-ray and lab-
oratory accounts, of which amounts the Budge Clinic is 
entitled to 75CC and the hospital to only 25o/o, when the 
same is collected by the hospital. 
It is submitted that a11: institution which can show a 
net gain (net earnings) for the year of $5000.00 and 
which has collected within one-half of one percent of all 
its accounts during the year is a very successful business 
and not a charitable institution, and is not entitled to 
have its pr()perty exempt on the ground that i~ is used ex-
clusively for charitable purposes. 
Prior to the year 1927, the hospital had paid off an 
obligation of $10,000.00 and had in addition to that ac-
cumulated a surplus of $31,000.00, since its organization 
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in 1914.. This $31,000.00 was put into the Nurses' Home 
built in 1927. This also shows that it is a successful and 
g-rowing business institution. 
D. The purported amendment to Article 6, voted on 
January 31st, 1928, and filed on February 11, 1928, was 
and is not effective and cannot aid the plaintiff corpora-
tion in its effort to avoid payment of its taxes on the hos-
pital property, for: (1) The amendment purports to alter 
o:r change the original purpose of the corporation, which, 
under ou:r statutes, can not be done except by the approv-
al and consent of all of the outstanding stock (Sec. 886, 
Compiled Laws 1917). There was, as appears from the 
evidence, at the time of the proposed amendn1ent 4042 
shares of stock outstanding in plaintiff corporation and 
from the certified minute entry by the Secretary, attach-
ed and filed with the proposed amendment (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit C). it affirmatively appears that there were only 
2260 .shares of stock represented at the. stockholder's 
meeting when the proposed amendment was voted, and 
adopted. It is therefore submitted that the proposed 
amendment is void and of .no force or effect, and did not 
in fact alter or change the original purpose of the corpor-
ation. It follows that the plaintiff is not organized .as a 
charitable institution at the present time. It is organized 
~ any other fina.ncial business corporation, whether the 
profit and gain goes to the corporation, for its further 
growth and expansion, or to the stockholders, is im-
material so far as its liability to pay taxes is .concerned; 
Lodge vs. Speth, 106 Pac .. 1077 (Ka:n.). 
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The la\\" required that if plain tift. \Vas or~~: an ized for 
pecuniary profit it n1ust set forth the amount of it:' r:tpital 
stock and shares. This the plaintitl' did. The .-\ rt iciPs 
are in harmony with a business corporation. and \\'holly 
inconsistant with those of a charitable organization. "The 
fact that plaintiff corporation "·as formed and org·anized 
to treat and care for the sick and injured is not control-
ling for such thing may be done for profit as well as for 
charity.•• 
Holy Cross Hospital, 88 Pac. 691 (Utah). 
Public Society vs. Board of Review, 125 N. E. 7 (Ill.) 
People vs. Hospital, 87 N. E. 305. 
The right to an exemption can only be established by 
strict proof of the existence of all facts necessary to 
authorize it. Institutions must be organized for public 
charity, and not for profit, and an essential element is that 
it shall not have the power to declare dividends. 
Plaintiff also pays a corporation license tax, and has 
done so up to the present time, which it would not be re-
quested to do if it was a charitable corporation, or a cor-
poration not organized for pecuniary profit. Sec. 1271 
Comp. Laws, 1917. 
(2) If we assume the proposed amendment did alter 
the original purpose of the plaintiff corporation, still it 
does not aid the plaintiff for it came subsequent to the 
time when the tax lien had actually attached for the year 
1928, and therefore, could not affect or relieve the plain-
tiff from its liability to pay its taxes which had already 
accrued for that year. 
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The tax lien on plaintiff's personal property for 1928, 
attached to plaintiff's real estate, as of January 1, 1928, 
and the tax lien for the real estate and improvements for 
1928, attached as of the second Monday in January, 1928 
-Sec. 5996, 5997, Comp. Laws, 1917, Sec. 5995, specific-
ally provides that the tax lien is not satisfied or removed 
until the tax is paid. In the case of Union Cent. Life Ins. 
Co. vs. Black, 24 7 Pac. 486, this Court approves and up-
holds this provision of the law. 
" 
E. The plaintiff admits in its Reply, and the undis-
puted evidence shows that the plaintiff regularly files its 
claim against Cache County to cover the hospital fee for 
i·ndige.nt poor patients who are treated at the hospital and 
are unable to pay the hospital charges. It is submitted 
that the plaintiff has thereby forfeited its rig~t to claim 
that its property i·s exempt from taxes on. any ground to 
claim that its property is used for charitable purposes to 
such an extent that it should be exempt from the payment 
of taxes. 
The theory upon which tax exemption is granted to 
charitable i1nstitutio.ns, is, that by dispensing charity and 
relief to the poor and those in need of help, (which aoo 
otherwise a burden on the state and ·society) the State 
and society is benefitted to a larger extent than the 
amount of the taxes, which would otherwise be received 
from such institution, for the state is thus relieved of the 
burden which otherwise devolves upon it and society,-to 
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care for poor and indigent persons who are sick and un-
able to care for then1selves. 
~6 R. r. L 316. 
Commissioners vs. Makibben, ~9 A. S. R. :l~~ (Ky.). 
Public Society vs. Board of Revie\\·, 1~5 N. E. 7 (Ill.). 
"The theory justifying exemption of this class 
of property so used is that the resultant benefits 
to the body politic will be equal to or in excess of 
the fa"<es \\·hich would otherwise be imposed, 
and such religious, scientific, literary or charit-
able use of the property should be encouraged by 
relief from taxation. But the statute says it shall 
only be exempt when the property is used for 
these purposes, and not held or leased out for 
profit. It is a rule so well established as to need 
no citation of authority, that it is incumbent upon 
the person who claims his property as exempt 
from taxation to show that the use of that prop-
erty clearly falls within the exception. The rule 
of strict construction applies, and, if any doubt 
arises as to the exemption, that doubt must be 
decided against the person who claims the exemp-
tion. While it must be borne in mind that the 
decisions of other jurisdictions are largely in-
fluenced by their constitutional and statutory 
provisions, it is quite generally held that where 
property belonging to a charitable institution is 
rented out or otherwise employed as a source of 
profit to the institution, it is not sufficient to save 
that property from taxation because the rent or 
income is devoted exclusively to charitable pur-
poses; the exemption is generally held to apply 
only to the property which is actually used and 
occupied for the charitable purposes for which 
the institution is organized." 
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The Court then cites a long list of cases and continues: 
"It is sufficient to .say that the great weight of 
autho~ity appears to be that, because the rents, 
issues, and profits of the property of a charitable 
institution are used for the purposes of charity, 
that fact will not exempt the property itself from 
taxation, under the rule of strict construction ap-
plicable where property is claimed to be exempt 
under the exceptions to the general rule that all 
property must bear its equal burdens of taxa-
tion." 
State vs. McDowell Lodge, 38 A. L. R. 31 (W. Va.). 
The evidence shows that the plaintiff hospital is not 
a hospital open to all medical practitioners in good stand-
ing in the medical association of this state, but is operat-
ed largely for the benefit and gain of certain members of 
the medical profession belonging to or affiliated with the 
Budge Clinic. The evidence also shows that the members 
of the Budge Clinic and those immediatelr associated with 
them own and control the majority of the stock of the 
plaintiff corporation; that Dr. D. C. Budge has been the 
medical director of the hospital and chairman of the 
medical staff since the organization of the hospital, and 
that he was the chief moving factor in its organization. 
That he absolutely controls the policy of the hospital by 
the special provisions of tlie Articles of Incorporation, to 
which we direct the cou"rt'.s attention. It will be observed 
from the articles of incorporation that the Board of Di-
rectors do not control the internal policy of the hospital, 
but that the same is left with the medical director and the 
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medical staff. Dr. D. C. Budge has done all of tht' Jnajor 
operations in the hospital since its incorporation, exct.\pt 
such as has bee-n done in later years by his brotherS. M. 
Budge, who has no"~ been associated \vith Dr. D. C. Buch?.·e 
in the surgical work. 
The evidence also shows that the Budge Clinic re-
ceives 75% of the gross earnings of the hospital from a 11 
X-ray and laboratory fees and that such earnings are paid 
to the Bu«L:,o-e Clinic without any deduction of any expense, 
and that the hospital is required to keep up the said ma-
chine and furnish all supplies, expenses, etc., connected 
with the -X-ray machine and the laboratory work out of 
the 25~ split which goes to the hospital. 
We also call attention to the evidence produced by 
Dr. E. L. Hansen (Ab. 61 and pages following) wherein 
it conclusively appears that the hospital was not open to 
qualified physicians in good standing except such as Dr. 
D. C. Budge and his associates chose to admit. It is there-
fore, submitted that the plaintiff hospital is operated and 
conducted for the professional and financial benefit of 
certain physicians, particularly the physicians belonging 
to the Budge Clinic,' and that its argument in regard to 
receiving charity patients is a mere pretense and made 
for the purpose of bringing the plaintiff corporation with-
in the statute exempting its property from taxation on 
the ground that it is a public charity and that its property 
is used exclusively for charity purposes. 
In the Sisters of the Third Order vs. Board of R•-
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view, 83 N .. E. 272, the Illinois Supreme Court definitely 
lays down the rule that under such a state of facts plain-
tiff institution is not entitled to tax exemption. 
"If a hospital is conducted for the use and 
profit of persons engaged in the practice of medi-
cine and surgery (City of Knoxville vs. Ft. San-
ders Hospital, 148 Tenn. 699, 257 S. W. 408; 
Mayor and Aldermen vs. Vicksburg Sanitarium, 
17 Miss. 709, 78 So. 702), or as wn adjunct to a 
medical college conducted for the profit of its 
owners (Gray Street Infirmary vs .. City of Louis-
ville, 65 S. W. 11, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1274, 55 L. R. 
A.) 270), it cannot be regarded a~s a charitable 
institution, and is subject to taxation. This is in 
accord with our holding concerning business col-
leges in the case of Lawrence Business College v. 
Bussing, 117 Kan. 436, 231 P. 1039." 
Nuns of Third Order of St. Dominic vs. Younkin, 235 
P. 872. 
In the Y ounken case the Kansas court held that the 
property of that hospital was, however, exempt from taxa-
tion for the reason that the corporation was organized 
for benevolent and charitable purposes, had no capital 
stock, ~could decleare no dividends and earned none, and 
devoted all of its income to the care of sick and injured 
who were unable to pay. These facts distinguish the 
Younken case from the case at bar. 
In addition to that it should be kept in mind that the 
only patients whq are accepted at the hospital without 
any charge being made against them are the members of 
the medical staff and their families. 
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The question of exemption fron1 payment of taxes on 
the ground that the property \\·as used exclusi,·t\ly for 
charitable purposes has been before our Suprenlt\ Court 
in the follo""ing cases: 
Ju~ae vs. Spencer, 15, Utah, 24~. 
State vs ... -\.rmstrong, 17 LTtah, 166. 
Parker vs. Quinn, 23 LTta.h, 332, 64 Pac. 961. 
Lodge \'S. Grosbeck, 40 Utah 1, Ann. Cas. 1914 C 940. 
Odd Fellows Assn. vs.. Co. Treasurer. 53 Utah, 111. 
In the Spencel' case. the Court used the following 
language , in regard to the claim of exemption: 
"The presumption is that all exemptions intend-
ed to be granted were granted in express terms. 
In such cases the rule of strict construction ap-
plies, and, in order to relieve any species of prop-
erty from its due and just proportion of the bur-
dens of the government, the language relied on, 
as creating the exemption, should be so clear as 
not to admit of reasonable controversy about its 
meaning, for all doubts must be resolved against 
the exemption." 
In the Armstrong case, supra, the question involved 
was whether or not the Legislature had power to provide 
by statute that the Board of Equalization might remit or 
abate the taxes of insane, idiotic, infirm, or indigent per-
sons, the court held that an abatement of the taxes in 
effect amount to an exemption, and that the Legislature 
had no such authority and used the following language: 
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"The difference in the sense of these terms 
therefore relates to the method, rather than the 
effect; for the ultimate result, whether by exemp-
tion or abatement, is precisely the same. In either 
case the property is relieved from the burden of 
taxation. Now it is apprehended that the in-
tention of the framers of the constitution, by ex-
empting certain property, was not so much to pre-
vent an assessment and levy of tax thereon as to 
free it from the burden of mai,ntaining the gov-
ernment. When the tax is abated or remitted 
after it has been levied, the same object is ac-
complished; and therefore the mandate of the 
constitution, that such burdens 'shall be equal 
and uruiform" on all property within the state, 
except such as is exempt by the fundamental 
law, and that 'every person and corporation shall 
pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or 
its property,' may·be violated by either method. 
It is true that the statute does not permit the 
abatement of all the tax, a:s does an exemption 
under the constitution; but it is equally true that 
if the legislature has power to enact a statute re-
leasing property, not exempt by the paramount 
law, from a portion of the tax, it has power to 
enact one abating all the tax on such property. 
The ~arne legal principles apply in either case. 
The meaning and intent manifest from the con-
stitution are that no property shall be relieved 
f'rom the burden of maintaining the government, 
except such as was defin,e.d and specified for ex-
emption by that instrument. No one would con-
tend for a moment that the legislature of thi·s 
state has power in express terms to exempt prop-
erty from taxation, other than that enumerated 
for exemption in the constitution; and yet in the 
enactment of the statute in question the legislat .. 
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ure has undertaken to indirectly exempt property 
not so enumerated. This is an attempt to do in-
directly that which could not be done directly, 
and the statute therefore is in violation of the 
constitution, and is void, as in excess of leg·islat-
ive authority. To prevent the legislature from 
exempting property not included within the ex-
emptions of the constitution, express words of in-
hibition were not necessary. The positive direc-
tion that "all property not exempt under the laws 
of the United States or under this constitution 
shall be taxed,' and that the rate of assessment 
and taxation shall be 'uniform and equal', so that 
'every person and corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, or its proper-
ty,' with the enumeration of· the property exempt-
ed, contains an implication against an exemption 
of any other property by the legislature. That di-
rection itself operates as a restraint upon the 
legislative power. Cooley, C-onst. Lim. 209; Kon-
old vs. Railway Co., 16 Utah 151. ·· 
In the case of Parker vs. Quinn, supra, the Relief 
Society, organized exclusively for charitable purposes, 
was the owner of a two-story building, the upper fioor was 
used by the Society for holding its meetings, the lower 
floor contained two store rooms, one of which was rented 
for $12.50 per month, and the other was being offered for 
the same rent. All the rental so received was used for 
charitable purposes; all the members of the society served 
as such without renumeration. The question involved \\7 as 
whether or not the property was used exclusively for 
charitable purposes and therefore exempt from taxation. 
The Lower Court held that the property was not exempt. 
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The Supreme Court held that the lower floor was subject 
to taxation, but that the upper floor, which was used ex-
clush,ely by the society was exempt. The Court used the 
following la·nguage: 
"It will be noticed that the provisions of the 
Constitution of the statute are practically the 
same, except that the statute omits the words 
"municipal corporations," but this omi·ssion is not 
material in this case. The exemptiortS thus ex-
pressly g·ranted, as we have seen, form an ex-
ception to the general rule that every species of 
property within the State is liable to bear its just 
proportion of the public burden. Any prope1·ty 
falling within the exceptian is releas.ed from this 
burden, and such r,elease is iustified on the theory 
that the State derives some peculiar benefit, 
whatever that may be, {'rom such propert-y. 
Among the several classes of property exempt are 
'lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively 
for either religious worship or .charitable pur-
poses.' In the case at bar, the 'relief society' 
which owns an.d manages the property, over 
which the controversy arose, was organized a·nd 
acts exclusi'VIely for charitable purposes. It 
ministers to the poor, sick and destitute of the 
eo:nmunity. Its p~.Irposes ar~ excellent and the 
nr.:·~ns adopted cc.mmendable, and no doubt the 
State is mea:.surably benefitted by having its poor 
and helpless subjects under the benign protec-
tion and care of such a society. If, therefore, in 
the fundamental law, in addition to specifying 
lots and buildings thereon used 'exclusively' for 
charitable purposes, rentals derived from such 
buildings and used for such purposes were also 
enumerated, we would have no difficulty in this 
case in declaring the whole property, including 
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the portion rented and held for rent. exen1pted 
fron1 taxation, but the la\\·makers did not see tit 
to exen1pt such rentals, in express terms, and \':e 
can furnish no aid by construction. Only such 
of the society's property. therefore. as is occu-
pied and used 'exclusively' for charitable purp-
oses is e.'t:empt from taxation. It follo,vs that the 
e.xemption does not extend to that portion not 
appropriated by the society to its O\vn use, but 
held as a source of revenue. Especially is this so 
since the value of each portion is ascertainable 
as appears from the findings of the court. Where, 
therefore, as in this case. a portion of certain 
property, owned by a charitable institution, is 
occupied and used by it for charitable purposes, 
and the other portion thereof is devoted to pur-
poses of revenue, the portion used and occupied 
for charitable purposes is exempt, and the por-
tion not so used and occupied is subject to taxa-
tion." 
In the Groesbeck case, supr~ the question involved 
was whether the Elks Home of Salt Lake City was ex-
empt from taxes. Our Supreme Court held, by divided 
opinion, that it was. Justice Frick writes the dissenting 
opinion, and we believe that it will be conceded that he 
cites the great weight of authority in his dissenting opin-
ion to the effect that even from the facts in that case the 
property should not be exempt. However, the Supreme 
Court did not over-rule the case of Parker vs. Quinn, but 
expressly approved of that- case in the following language: 
"The court held, (in Parker vs. Quinn) and 
properly so, that the portion of the building 
which was not used by the organization for its 
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own purposes, but was kept as an investment for 
business purposes, was not exempt from taxa-
tion." 
In the Odd Fellows' case, supra, the question involv-
ed wa:s whether the Odd Fellow's home was exempt from 
taxation. A porti~n of the building was leased and the 
rents were used for the purposes of the association. Our 
Supreme Court held that the property was not exempt 
from taxation. The Supreme Court, in that case also ex-
pressly observed the fact that the Elks .case and Quinn 
case were harmonious in principal. It was contended in 
the Odd Fellows' case, that a:s long as the rents and in-
come were used for the purpose of the association, that 
the building should be exempt. Our Supreme Court 
states counsel's position, and answers it in the following 
la:nguage: 
"We submit that such a construction, in our 
judgment, would amount to an absolute perver-
sion of the plain meaning and intent of the fram-
ers of the Constitution and the citizens of the 
state who afterwards voted for its adoption. If 
we will consider for a moment the situation to 
which such a .construction could and might pos-
sibly lead, every person of average intelligence 
must at once arrive at the conclusion that such 
cannot be the meaning wnd intention of the con-
stitution. To begin with, .it must be· conceded 
that the owners of property, to be exempt within 
the purview of the Constitution, are not limited 
to ecclesiastical or charitable organizations, but 
the exemption p·rivilege is extended to the class 
of property mentioned, without regard to the 
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character of its O\\'ner. The owner may be a 
church organization, a charitable or fraternal or-
ganization, or it may be a private indiYidual or a 
corporation .. It \viii also be conct~ded, \\'e assun1e, 
that a very large proportion of the taxpayers of 
the State of lltah annually contribute consider-
able sums to the maintenance of religious wor-
ship and for charitable purposes. The ag·gregate 
of these contributions \vould undoubtedly, amount 
to millions. Now, let us suppose that these tax-
payers. whether individuals or corporations, 
should conceive the idea that, inasmuch as they 
intend to contribute in any event to these relig-
ious and benevolent purposes, they will do so in 
such manner as to avoid the payment of taxes 
on a substantial portion of their property. Each 
of them, in pursuance of this idea, inves1s in a lot 
or lots, with a building or buildings, to such an 
extent that the income derived from the rents, 
issues and profits of the property will pay for the 
upkeep and repair thereof and enough over to 
satisfy his conscience respecting his religious 
and charitable obligations. Not a dollar for 
private or corporate gain is within the contemla-
tion of the owner, but in the utmost good faith 
the owner intends to use every cent of the in-
come, except sufficient for the upkeep and re-
pair, for religious or charitable purposes. The 
assessor appears on the scene; he attempts to 
assess ihe property, and the owner says he is 
using that property exclusively for religious 
worship, or that he is using it exclusively for 
charitable purposes and not for private or cor-
porate benefit. Under the contention of counsel 
for appellant, we do .not see why this could not be 
done. If it can be done by an ecclesiastical or 
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charitable organization it can be done by an in-
dividual or corporation who devotes the income 
to religious or charitable purposes. If such were 
done we have no means of knowing what the loss 
in revenue to the state would be, but the ·sum 
would unquestionably be so vast as to forever 
preclude the idea that the Constitution is sus-
ceptible of any such construction as that con-
tended for by appellant. On this question we 
unqualifiedly approve that portion of the opinion 
in the Quinn case, heretofore quoted, wherein 
the learned justice says: 
"If, therefore, in. the fundamental law, in ad-
dition to specifying lots and buildings thereon 
used 'exclusively' for charitable purposes, rent-
als derived from such buildings and used for 
such purposes were also enumerated, we would 
have no diffi.culty in this case in declaring the 
whole property, including the portion rented and 
held for rent, exempted from taxation; but the 
lawmakers did not see fit to exempt such rentals, 
in express terms, and we can furnish no aid by 
construction. Only suc;h of the society'·s proper-
ty, therefore, as is occupied and used 'exclusive-
ly' for charitable purposes, is exempt from taxa-
tion. It follows that the exemption does not ex-
tend to that portion not appropriated by the 
society to its own use, but held as a source of 
revenue." 
The question involved is of supreme import-
ance, both to the taxpayers of the state at large 
and to the owners of property claiming exemp-
tion from taxation. For that reason we have 
quoted at considerable length from the opinion 
in the Quinn case, which we cannot consider in 
a;ny other light than as conclusive and control-
ling in the present .case. 
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Much has bee.n said in ar~.nunent upon the 
question as to \Vheth~r or not a strict or liht\ral 
construction should be adopted in seeking· to as-
certain the meanin~ of the constitutional pro-
vision involved. In our judg·tnent, as contended 
by respondent, .. there is no t-oon1 for construc-
tion:· The language is plain. unequivocal, and 
unambiguous. The building itself, or the portion 
thereof for which exemption is claimed, as dist-
inguished from the rent or income derived there-
from, must be used exclusively for religious wor-
ship or charitable }:lurposes. This "·e believe to 
be the plain meaning of the Constitution, whether 
we adopt a strict or a liberal construction. The 
opinion in the Quinn case by an undivided court 
held that to be the true meaning, and, as before 
suggested, the Court in the Elks case unanimous-
ly adopted the same view, although disagreeing 
on other questions not pertinent to this appeal. 
As to the question of a strict or liberal con-
struction, if it were at all controlling in this case, 
we might suggest that appellant has no reason 
whatever to complain. A strict construction of 
the constitutional provision, as we understand it, 
would subject the entire building to taxation, for 
the reason that it is not all used exclusively for 
religious worship or charitable purposes. We 
are clearly of the opinion that the court in the 
Quinn case adopted an exceedingly liberal con-
struction when it held that the property might 
be segregated for purposes of taxation." 
The Groesbeck case is also to be distinguished from 
case at bar, for in that case the Court assumed that the 
Elks Lodge was a charitable institution, which as we 
have already pointed out plaintiff clearly is not. It was 
also said in the Groesbeck case that the social uses to 
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which the property was put were indirectly to promote 
the social aims of the organization, that the charity dis-
persed by fraternal societies consisted not only of material 
assistance, but of moral assistance also, which was the 
embodiment of sympathy and kindness, none of which 
elements appear in the record in case at bar. 
The annotation to the Groesbeck case in Ann. Cas. 
1914C at page 958, points out, that in the two other Elks 
Lodge cases which had then been. decided, Mass. and Wis-
consin, both cases held contrary to the Utah case-that the 
Elks home was .not exempt as property used exclusively 
for charitable purposes. 
In a subsequent case, Lodge V'S. Koeln, Ann, Cas. 
1916E, 784, (Mo.) the Missouri court also pointed out that 
the property of Elks Lodge No. 9, was used for lodge and 
club purposes and was not used exclusively for charity 
within the meaning and contemplation of the Constitu-
tion, and hence was not exempt from taxation. The Mis-
souri Court held that the "exclusive" use provided for in 
the Constitution, "implied that all other uses be exclud-
ed." The Missouri Court expressly refused to follow the 
Groesbeck case. 
It will, therefore, be observed that the Utah cases 
are in harmony on the proposition that the property itself 
(not the rentals or revenues derived therefrom) must be 
used exclusively fo charitable purposes. In the Quinn 
case, the Groesbeck case and the Odd Fellows case, the 
orga,nizations w.ere in each respective case charitable or-
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ga~izations--organized for l·haritable and fratt~rnal pur-
poses and for no other purpose. Such is not the case of 
plaintiff corporation. In the Groesbeck case the court 
found and held that the Elks Lodge \vas a charitable in-
stitiution, and that in as much as the property was occu-
pied and used by the lod~ itself for lodge purposes, 
(which were admittedly charitable and fraternal) this 
court held that, within the contemplation of the Constitu-
tion, the property was used for charitable purposes and 
was therefore exempt. 
The same distinction is made in the Quinn case, and 
also the Odd Fellows case. Both of these organizations 
were found and in each case held to be charitable organi-
zations,organized for charitable purposes. That portion 
of the property which was directly occupied and used by 
the Relief Society was held to be used exclusively for a 
charitable purpose, for the Relief Society was organized 
for the purpose of dispensing charity. That portion of 
the building which was not directly occupied and used by 
the society itself, was held not to be exempt, even though 
the rentals received therefrom were devoted to the pur-
pose and use of the society. The same distinction and rule 
is applied in the Odd Fellows case, and hence that portion 
of the building not directly occupied and used by the lodge 
itself, was held not to be exempt, although the rentals 
from this property were devoted to the purpose of the 
Lodge which were admittedly charitable. 
It is submitted that the case at bar does not and can 
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not con1e within this rule. In the first place the plaintiff 
corporation was not and is not organized as a charitable 
institution. It has every ear mark of a business institu-
tion organized for pecuniary gain and profit and none of 
the ear marks of a ~haritable institution. In the second 
place, as we have already poihted out, the evidence con-
clusively shows that it is not the policy of the hospital it-
self to disperse charity to any of its patients. The doc-· 
tors often forego their doctor's fees to poor patients, but 
the hospital fees must always be paid, either by the relief 
society, the bishop of the ward or club which brings the 
poor patient, or by the County, where the patient is im-
pecunious and is not under the care of the Relief Society, 
bishop, etc. 
The plaintiff hospital rents its beds to its patients for 
stipulated and fixed sums depending on the rooms select-
ed by the patient; these charges are made to rich and poor 
patients alike. A bed in a ward is $2.50 per day; a bed in 
a semi-ward is $3.50 per day; a private room is $4.00 and 
$5.00 per day; depending on the room.. It is true that in 
addition to the bed the patient also receives certain serv-
ice and care by the .nurses and. such food and drink as the 
patient should have.. But this is all covered and paid for 
by the patient in the hospital .charges. The receipient 
pays for the service and accommodations which he re-
ce1ves. 
Hence it is submitted that the various rooms occupied 
and paid for by the patients come exactly within the same 
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rule and provision as that portion of its property which 
the Relief Society rented out in the Quinn case, or that 
portion of the building, in the Odd Fellows case fron1 
which rentals were received by the lodge but which 
property was in each case held by this court not to be ex-
empt fron1 the payment of taxes because not used ex-
clusively for charitable purposes within the provision of 
the Constitution. 
Indeed, the property of plaintiff in the case at bar 
does not come within the same equitable reason and con-
siderations as was, and could well be urged on behalf of 
the property so rented in the Quinn case, a·nd also in the 
Odd Fellows case. There the rentals were, in each case, 
used and devoted to the purposes of the organization which 
purposes were admittedly charitable. In the case at bar 
the plaintiff organization or corporation is not charitable, 
it was not organized as a charitable institution, and does 
not use or purport to devote its earnings (rentals) from 
im property for charitable purposes, but proposes to set it 
aside as a sinking fund for future growth and expansion 
of the corporation. 
The fact that the plaintiff corporation adopts a rule, 
in the form of an amendment to one of its articles, that' it 
will not in the future declare any dividends to its stock-
holders, or pay its officers any salary, but will from time 
to time set apart the net profits arising from the operation 
of the hospital "as a sinking fund, to be used whenever, 
in the opinion of the Board, the same should be used for 
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the maintenance, enlargement or improvement of the hos-
pitals or other corporate properties," does not present any 
equitable reason that we can discern why that corpora-
tion should .not pay its taxes as the constitution and law 
of our 'State provide. 
It is of course obviou~ that the stockholders could at 
some future time, when a large sinking fund has thus ac~ 
cumulated, again be called to meet and vote to change or 
amend article six so as to permit the accumulated sinking 
fund to be divided among the stockholders in the form of 
dividends; or if the hospital buildings, equipment, etc., 
had been sufficiently enlarged, from such accumulated 
sinking fund, article six could readily be changed back so 
as to carry out the original purpose of the corporation and 
thereafter permit dividends to be declared from the .net 
earnings of the corporation, and the stockholders of the 
corporation would thereby have received the full benefit 
of avoiding payment of taxes for the intermittent period 
of years. Undoubtedly this amendment was made and 
intended for the best interest of the plaintiff corporation 
itself, .not for the best interest of the public. It should be 
noted that the Secretary in his Notice of Stockholders' 
meeting said: "It is the opinion of the Board of Directors 
that this amendment should be made as. it would be for 
the best interest of the hospital.." 
It must be very obvious to the Court that the only 
purpose of the purported amendment to Article six was 
an excuse to avoid payment of its taxes. The corpora-
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tion has paid its ta.~es each year since its incorporation in 
1914, up to 1H28. and during all of this period, it is admit-
ted both in the pleadings &"nd the testin1ony, that its 
policy and method of operation and chan.!.·ing: and collect-
ing its hospital bills from all patients who entered its hos-
pital for care and treatment has been the same. There 
has been no change in the policy of the ins~itution. That 
being tru~ why should the plaintiff's property be exempt 
from ta.~es for the year 19~8 as distinguished from prior 
years? Plaintifrs counsel gave as his ans\\'er in the lower 
court, that due to this amendment to article 6, no officer 
or stockholder of the corporation did in 1928, nor will in 
the future, make a dollar or a dime from the corporation, 
but all of the earnings of the corporation are to be plowed 
back into that institution for its enlargement and provid-
ing better hospital facilities etc., so as to better serve and 
care for the general public and particularly its patients. 
This merely amounts to saying that if the institution 
had more money to spend for its development and pur-
chase of the latest and most modern equipment, etc., then 
it would be better able to serve and care for its patrons. 
That is not only true of the business of conducting 
and operating a hospital, but we believe, the ;merchant, 
the banker, the cobbler, the baker, the manufacturer, and 
all the rest could truthfully make the same argument, 
e. g,. if they had more money to use and devote to their 
respective business institutions, to make proper and nec-
essary enlargements, additions and betterments, and in-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
stall the latest a:nd most modern equipment, etc., that then 
they would in each case better serve and care for their 
respective patrons and customers. 
Undoubtedly a good many private business institu-
tions would be very glad to thus amend their articles of 
incorporation, and :provide that in the future all the earn-
ings of the corporation shall be set aside as a sinking fund, 
and that it shall, from time to time, be expended for the 
proper enlargement. and betterment of the corporate prop-
erties as the Board of Directors may deem for the best 
interest of the corporation. 
If such method for avoiding payment of taxes is legal 
for a hospital, organized and conducted as a private cor-
poration for pecuniary profit and gain, then there seems 
.no reason why other business institutions may not adopt 
similar amendments to their articles of incorporation, and 
thus also es.cape payment of taxes. The mere statement 
of such a proposition is its own answer. To sanction such 
conduct and method for avoiding payment of taxes, 
strikes at once at the very root and foundation of our 
government and nullifies the Constitution~ 
In County vs. Sisters of Charity, 44 Pac. 252 (Colo.) . 
the Colorado ~onstitution expressly exempted "**all** 
hospitals for the care of the sick, whether supported in 
whole or in part by charity." But even under such liberal 
provision of the Constitution, it was held that lands occu-
pied by and used in connection with such hospitals are 
not exempt. 
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••Jt is a. well-settled rule that statutes exempt-
ing persons or property fron1 taxation art:' to be 
strictly construed, and that exemptions art' not 
to be extended, by judicial construction, to prop-
erty other than that which is expressly designt-
ed by law:' Cooley, Taxation. pp. ~0-t-~05. 
7 C.-J. 1051. ··\\"here the exemption of prop-
erty from taxation is involved. the distinction 
betv;een the benevolent or charitable associa-
tions and beneficial associations is sharply drawn. 
Laws of e.xemption are to be strictly construed. 
A charity is held to mean a public charity, one 
whose benefits are extended to needy persons 
generally, 'vithout regard to their relation to the 
members of the society, or to the fees paid. A 
beneficial society whose beneficence is confined 
to the members, their families, dependents or 
frien~ and depends upon the contributions 
mad~ is not a charity, but a private institution 
for the mutual advantage of the members. The 
property of such a society is therefore not exempt 
from taxation under a law exempting the prop-
erty of charities.·· 
City of Knoxville vs. Fort Sanders Hospital, 257 S. W. 
408 (Tenn.). Where hospital with research laboratory 
and X-ray outfit was erected and maintained by certain 
physicians as a place to treat their patients and to per-
form their operations and to conduct a school for training 
nurses and a big majority of patients were charged very 
substantial prices for their accommodations, the property 
was held not exempt from tax under a statute similar to 
Utah. 
City of San Antonio vs. Santa Rosa Infirmary, 249 S. 
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W. 498 (Tex.). Hospital which received no gift for its 
foundation but purchased its property from another cor-
poration and assumed a legal obligation to pay therefor 
and which paid all of its operating expenses from funds 
received from patients who were able to pay for their 
care, and were charged ordinary hospital rates, and which 
hospital, in addition, earned a profit to apply on the pur-
chase price of the property, and on additions and improve-
ments, is not a purely public charity and not exempt. 
The fact that a hospital which paid its operating expenses 
and realized a profit from patients who were able to and 
did pay for their care, devoted a small portion of its ac-
tivities to the care of patients unable to pay therefor, 
does not make it a charitable institution entitled to ex-
emption from taxation. 
In the case, City of Vicksburg vs. Sanitarium, 78 So. 
702, (Miss.) The court held that a hospital treating some 
charity patients, but primarily for pay, that is, primarily 
for treatment of those who could pay, was not exempt 
under a statute exempting "hospital or other charitable 
use." 
"Where a hospital is .conducted for the use and 
profit of persons engaged in the practice of medi-
cine and surgery, or as an adjunct to a medical 
college conducted for the profit of its owners, it 
ca·nnot be regarded as a charitable institution, 
and is subject to taxation." 
City of Knoxville vs. Ft. Sanders Hospital (Tenn.) 
257 s.. w. 408. 
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Mayor and Aldermen ,.s. Vieksburg Sanitaritnn 
(Miss.) 78 S. W. 702. 
Gray Street Infirmary vs. City of Louisville (Ky.), 
65 s .. w. 11. 
The courts often state. and it is undoubtedly a gen-
eral rule followed in the majority of cases, that a hospital 
institution \vhich is adn1ittedly charitable and \Vhich was 
founded and erected as such, does not lose its charitable 
or eleemosynary character by reason of the fact that it 
charges and collects from such patients as are able to pay 
for the actual necessities furnished, for the amounts thus 
received are not for private gain, but contribute to the 
more effectual accomplishment of the purpose for which 
the charity was founded, to dispense charity to those who 
are in need of its services, and who are unable to pay. 
Downs vs. Harper ·Hospital, 25 A. L. R. 602, 5 (Mich.). 
Trustees of Orphan School vs. Louisville, 40 L. R. A. 
119 (Ky.) But this rule does not apply in case at bar. 
Plaintiff was not organized nor created as a charitable 
institution nor did it take any patients in as pure charity 
patients .. 
The primary use to which the property is put it to be 
considered in determining whether it falls within the 
terms of the exemption. Grand Lodge vs. Board of Re-
view, 117 N. E. 1016 (Ill.). 
In many cases where the property has been held ex-
empt it has been on the ground and assumption that since 
the Lodge, or other owner, was conducted for charitable 
or benevolent purposes only, the property in question was 
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to be considered as presumably used exclusively for such 
purposes. 
Lodge vs. Cass County, 113 N. W. 167 (Neb.). 
Such reasoning and presumption can not be applied 
in the case at bar, for the plaintiff corporation was not 
organized as a charitable institution, but as a corpora-
tion organized for pecuniary profit. 
A clause in a Constitution, exempting property "used 
exclusively for public charity", has often been declared 
to refer not to the character of the corporation or associa-
tion owning the property for which the exemption was 
sought, but to the nature of its use. 
Grand Lodge vs. Taylor 226 S. W. 129 (Ark.). 
Chaffee County vs. Denver R. R. Employees, 22 A. L. 
R. 902, 203 Pac. 850 (Colo.) . 
Lacy vs. Davis 83 N. W. 784 (Iowa). 
By the word "Charitable" in a statute exempting 
property used exclusively for charitable purposes, is 
meant a practical philan.trophy and .not merely the teach-
ing and encouraging of unselfish principles. 
Scottish Rite Bldg. Co. vs. County, 17 A. L. R. 1020 
(Nebraska). 
Vogt vs. Loifisville, Ann. Cas. 1918E 1040 (Ky.). 
In Atty. Gen. vs. Detroit, 71 N. W. 632 (Mich.) the 
statute contained the following exemption: "Such real 
I 
estate as shall be ow.ned and occupied by library, benevo-
lent, charitable, educational and scientific institutions, in-
corporated under the laws of this State, with the buildings 
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and other property thereon, while occupied by them solely 
for the purposes for \vhich they were encorporated." In 
holding that the property of the Masonic Temple Assn., 
was not exen1pt thereunder the court said: 
"It is not enough in order to exempt such as-
sociations from taxation, that one of the direct or 
indirect pur:rn;es or results is benevolent, chari-
ty, education, or the promotion of science. They 
mJCSt be organized chiefly, if not solely, for one 
o-r more of these obiects. 
"Where contributions are made by members 
who in turn are entitled to certain benefits 
from the claimant for exemption, bestowing such 
benefits cannot be deemed charity, the benevo-
lent provisions are based upon sufficient legal 
consideration, and are in the nature of insur-
an~ or a mutual benefit society." 
State Council vs. Board of Review, 64 N. E. 1104 (Ill.) 
Royal Highlanders vs. State 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 380 
(Nebraska). 
In Re: Linen & Woolen Drapers Inst. L. T. N. S. 949 
(Eng.). 
The rental of a portion of a building belonging to a 
Lodge, although devoted to the purposes of the Lodge, 
prevents exemption under a statute exempting from tax-
ation property "used exclusively" for purely charitable, 
50 L. R. A. 191 (Mo.). 
Society vs. Kelley, 42 P. 3 (Ore.) . 
Odd Fellows Bldg. Assn., 177 Pac. 214 (Utah). 
Grand Lodge of Masons, 78 Atl. 973 (Vt.) 
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In Lodge vs. Redus, 29 So. 163 (Miss.) the court said: 
"It is said in argument that income is used for 
charity, and that makes it the same in effect as 
if the property itself was used for charity. But 
that is 1not the letter of the law, nor its spirit." 
In Phillips vs. St. Louis R. R. Ci., 17 L. R. A (N. S.) 
1167 (Mo.) ·The R. R. Co. organized a hospital for the 
benefit of its employees who contributed to its support. 
The Court said: 
"It has but few of the ear marks of a voluntary 
benevolent association, nor are there any ear 
marks of a public .charity. What is received is 
paid for by the receipients. Under the weight 
of authority it cannot be held to be a charitable 
institution." 
In the New Standard Club vs. McRaven, Ann. Cas. 
1918E 27 4 the Mississippi Court held: ''One claiming to 
fall within the statute exempting property from taxation 
has the burden of proof." The New Hampshire Court in 
St. Pauls Church vs. City of Concord, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 
350, held: "The burden is upon one claiming his property 
exempt from taxation .. to establish the fact by clear proof 
that the legislature so intended." 
That oral testimony is not admissable to show the 
character of an institution was decided in Bishop of St. 
John's vs. 'rreasurer, 86 Pac. 1021, at page 1023, the Colo-
rado Court said: 
"We think the objection was well taken. The 
character of the institution is to be determined 
by the purpose of its construction and the man-
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ner of its operation. and ·not by the opinion of 
any individual as to whether its work conforms 
to his notion of charity or not. .. 
In the case of Gitzhoffen vs. Sisters of Holy t ~ross 
Hospital Ass'n, 88 Pac .. 691 (Utah) our Supreme Court 
also held that the question whether or not a hospital was 
a charitable institution and the purpose of its organiza-
tion was to be determined from its Artieles of Incorpora-
tion, and not from oral testimony; and in that case the 
court held: ''that the articles of incorporation and the 
statute showed the corporation in question to be one for 
pecuniary profit, and not charity." 
An instructive note is also found in 16 L. R. A. ( N. 
S.) 830, giving the definitions and charitable character of 
claimants of exemption.. The meaning of "charity" as 
used in the constitution, is ''a gift to promote the welfare 
of others,''-23 LRA 545 (Pa.) To entitle a corporation 
to exemption under statute relieving from taxation charit-
able institutions, etc. it is essential that the paramount 
purpose be one of the objects named in the statute, 42 
LRA28L 
Another instructive annotation is found in 7 Ann. 
Cas. 39, where the annotator shows that the great majori-
ty of the cases hold with the Illinois case there reported, 
that property held by a fraternal beneficial society for 
the use of its members is not property held for charitable 
purposes within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
vision exempting property held for charitable purposes 
from taxation, and that being true it must certainly fol-
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low that the mere fact that the hospital has decided to put 
all its earnings in a sinking fund and expend the same 
from time to time in the further growth and developement 
I 
of the institution does not make its property exempt from 
the payment of its taxes. 
At the hearing before the trial court the plaintiff's 
counsel· cited a number of cases holding that hospital 
property is used exclusively for .charitable purposes, al-
though the hospital charges the patients who enter the in-
stitution for care and treatment. But it is submitted that 
all those cases are to be distinguished from the case at 
bar. For exemple: in the case of St. Elizabeth Hospital vs. 
Lancaster County (Neb.) 189 N. W. 981; the court stated 
that, "the hospital property is owned and the hospital 
was founded by the Franciscan Sisters that the general 
purpose of the sacred order to which these sisters belonged 
is to .nurse the sick, and care for the orphans, they are 
prompted only by the love of God, and are bound by a 
vow of poverty. The property owned by them is used for 
the purpose for which they have dedicated their lives." 
The court also stated in that case that the burden of gov-
er.nm.ent in caring for the poor is borne by that hospital. 
It is very evideht that such facts are widely different 
from the facts in ~case at bar. 
Likewise, in the case of 8isters of St. Francis vs. 
Board of Review, 83 N. E. 272. This likewise was a case 
where the hospital property was owned by the Sisters of 
St. Francis. The court stated, it was organized, "not for 
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pecuniary profit, but for the purpose of conductin~: a hos-
pital and training school for nurses. Patients who are 
lt~ithout 1~1oney are ca,.ed {o,. ·u,itllO'ut any cha.rge being 
made and ap·e deJuYntinated, "char-ity patie-nt.",· No such 
facts appear in the case at bar. In our case all patients 
are charged if the patient is impecunious the bishop of 
the ward, the relief society, etc., or the County n1ust pay 
the hospital fee. 
In the case of New England Sanitarium vs. Stonehatn 
91 N. E. 385 (Mass.) The court found that the hospital 
was incorporated ''for the purpose of founding a hospital 
or charitable asylum, for the care and relief of indigent, 
or other sick or infirm persons,'' etc.. This was the main 
purpose of founding the hospital, although the articles 
also provide that the hospital may receive pay patients. 
No such provision are to be found in the articles of incor-
poration of the plaintiff hospital in case at bar. The court 
also observed "if petitioner had decided to receive only 
those patients who were able to pay until from the accum-
ulated profits the institution could be maintained solely 
for the relief of the poor, the real estate during the period 
of accumulation would not have been occupied exclusively 
for charitable purposes within the meaning of the stat-
utes." The hospital in case at bar is charging all patients 
and is accumulating its earnings in a sinking fund, $5000, 
the net earnings for the year was set aside in such sink-
ing fund for the year 1928. Yet plaintiff claims its prop-
erty should be exempt for that year. 
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In the Lutheran Hospital vs. Baker, 167 N. W. 148 
(S. D.), the court stated that the "plaintiff is organized 
under the .civil code relating to benevolent corporations. 
The articles provide that its plan of operation shall be to 
orga~ize and establish a suitable hospital as a church 
charity or benevolent society. The articles of incorpora-
tion and the charter permit of no capital stock to be issued. 
The association provides that in case the patient is unabbe 
to pay no charge of any kind is made, and that the attend-
ing physician s.hall in sruch cases donate his services. 
·When the patient~s are urtabl~ to pay the regular rates 
they ,a1ie only asked and required to pay what they reas-
mably can." It will be readily seen that all of these facts 
widely distinguish the above case from case at bar. In 
the above case 95<fo of the patients are pay patients and 
5<fo were pure .charity patients, many of the pay patients 
were probably only part pay. The court said: "We are of 
the opinion that the appellant is a corporation or society 
organized and conducted exclusively for charitable purp-
oses and that its said property was and is used exclusively 
for such purposes." In the Baker case the court reasoned 
as did this Court in the Quinn, Groesbeck and Odd Fel-
low's cases. Such reasoning as we have seen, can not be 
applied to the case at bar because plaintiff corporation is 
not and wa:s not organized as a charitable institution. 
We fully agree with the principal laid down in the 
Baker case, that an institution founded as a purely public 
charity does not lose its .character as such merely from 
the fact that it receives revenue from, or charges its pat-
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ients who are able to pay. The South Dakota Court dis-
tinguished the Baker case from the case of State ,.s. Board 
of Equalization 92 N. W. lt), in \vhich case there was evi-
dence that part of the hospital property of the charitable 
institution was being rented out, and the rents devoted to 
the upkeep and maintenance of the hospital. 
We do not have access to several other cases cited by 
plaintiffs counsel, but we believe that everyone of the 
cases can be distinguished in the same manner as the cases 
just cited. 
If this court shall be of the opinion that the evidence 
in this case is sufficient to warrant the Findings of the 
Court that the plaintiff's property was used exclusively 
for charitable purposes and is therefore exempt, then we 
respectfully submit and urge that the trial court erred in 
denying the defendanfs motion for a new trial, on account 
of error of the court in excluding the testimony of defend-
ant's witnesses in proof of defendant's allegation in his 
answer that plaintiff corporation charged large and sub-
stantial fees in 1928, and for many years prior thereto 
from all its patients, and that it had on various occasions 
during that period held and detained patients at the hos-
pital until the hospital fees were paid, these allegations 
were specifically denied by the reply thus putting in issue 
the conduct and operation of the plaintiff hospital not 
only for the year 1928, but for many years prior thereto. 
In other words, the period of time put in issue was 
not only the year 1928, but many years prior thereto, and 
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upon such issues the defendant's counsel prepared their 
case. We accordingly had a large number of witnesses 
who covered eight or ten years, a:nd who had had the ex-
perience of being detained at the hospital or having their 
loved ones held until the hospital fees were paid. But the 
court arbitrarily refused to allow these witnesses to testi-
fy. We submit that defendant's evidence and offer to 
prove by these witnesses that not only did the plaintiff 
hospital charge all patients, including poor patients who 
were unable to pay, but upon many occasions had actually 
detained the patient and refused to allow him or her to 
leave the hospital until the hospital fees were paid, was 
admissable under the issues formed by the pleadings. 
We submit that the action of the trial court in thus 
arbitrarily refusing to permit these witnesses to testify 
to such conduct on behalf of the plaintiff hospital was re-
versible error in view of the issues which had been made, 
and in view of plaintiff's contention that its property was 
exempt because used exclusively for charitable purposes. 
There is no contention on behalf of the plaintiff that 
the policy in 1928 was different in a.ny respect from prior 
years. In fact, Dr. D. C. Budge, stated the policy was· the 
same. As stated in our affidavit for a new trial, had the 
issues been narrowed down to the year 1928, by the plead-
. ings, then defendant would then have concentrated its 
efforts upon securing witnesses to testify as to the con-
duct of the hospital covering only that year. But inas-
much as the issues were made broader and were made to 
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cover not only the year 1928. but tnany uears p·rior th~·reto, 
we had a right to reply upon the pleading'S and to prepare 
our case accordingly, and the court's ruling in excluding 
this offered_testimony by defendant covering said period, 
and which would affirmatively show the real policy of 
plaintiff hospital, was reversible error. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE D. PRESTON 
LEON FONNESBECK 
Attorneys for Defendant and AppeUcmt. 
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